Shamoon The Wiper: further details (Part II)

There have been persistent media reports that the Shamoon wiper malware we previously covered is linked to attacks against Saudi Aramco.

The hardcoded date in the body of destructor matches exactly the declaration by a hacker group about the date and time when the Saudi Aramco company would had been hit but we still cannot definitively confirm that Shamoon was to blame for those attacks.

And just about two weeks later, another energy company in the Middle East (RasGas) fell victim to another malware attack and the media has logically asked questions about whether Shamoon was responsible.

We leave the speculation up to others and concentrate strictly on sharing technical details. This is the continuation of our investigation into Shamoon:


The main Shamoon module has a resource PKCS7:113 that maintains an executable which is saved to disk as %WINDIR%\System32\NETINIT.EXE and this program poses a module to communicate with CNC. This program waits for parameters to be run with. The author was not too creative and coded a handling of just two argument values which can be “0” or “1”.

If “0”, the program takes a second argument and treats it as a data to be passed to CNC. With this argument value, the malware connects to CNC just once and stops executing. We have not located any place in the Shamoon code where netinit.exe would be run with argument “0”.

But as you would recall, we did locate the place where netinit.exe is launched with a command line “netinit.exe 1”. The program then enters into a loop until another destructive module creates a file %WINDIR%\ inf\netfb318.pnf signaling that the time has come to wipe data and kill the operating system. While netinit.exe waits for that file it regularly connects to CNC to report itself and receiving commands.

Read more: Shamoon The Wiper: further details (Part II)

Story added 21. September 2012, content source with full text you can find at link above.