Multiplatform Boleto Fraud Hits Users in Brazil

A study conducted around June last year revealed a malware-based fraud ring that infiltrated one of Brazil’s most popular payment methods – the Boleto Bancário, or simply the boleto. While the research and analysis was already published by RSA, we’ve recently discovered that this highly profitable fraud is still out in the wild and remains an effective way for cybercriminals for online banking theft in Brazil.

The boleto malware campaign had a reported potential loss of US$3.75 billion. The recent detections we found comprise malicious Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome extensions cleverly installed in victims’ machines. Spammed messages with fake threats of debt that must be paid to governments are used to get users to install these extensions.

What is a “boleto”?

The boleto (or “ticket” in English) is a type of payment slip that serves as a method of payment in Brazil regulated by the Brazilian Federation of Banks (FEBRABAN). Each boleto has a printed bar code and number associated with the person’s bank account, among other details. For instance, when users shop online, they may opt to use the boleto method of payment instead of credit cards and direct money transfers. If users decide to choose the boleto payment method, the shopping website generates a payment slip with a bar code that users can view, copy, or print in order to issue the payment. Here’s an example of a boleto.

Figure 1. Example of a boleto for R$934.23 (Brazilian Real). The bar code matches the number on the top. Both can be used to pay the boleto. Other items in the boleto include the person’s full name and phone number.

The use of the boleto payment method isn’t limited to online shopping websites. Government fees, car and house taxes, and almost any kind of payment can also be paid using it. It is a very common payment method in Brazil, a country where 18% of total bank transactions take place online.

How does the boleto infection take place?

To give an overview about how the infection takes place, here’s a diagram that shows how the attack plays out starting from the users receiving spammed messages to money ending up with the money mules.

Boleto fraud attack flow

The BROBAN malware family is frequently used in boleto fraud. These arrive via spammed emails, which typically contain fake messages alleging that the user has “debts” to the government that must be paid. Malicious links in the emails lead the user to install a browser extension (either for Mozilla Firefox or Google Chrome), as seen below:

Figure 2. Malicious browser extension in Mozilla Firefox

In the example below, criminals didn’t bother spending time to write a proper description for the add-on and limited it to “a basic add-on.” This was probably retained from a basic add-on creation tutorial.

Figure 3. Basic add-on creation tutorial for Mozilla Firefox

Below is an example of a malicious browser extension with bar code changing techniques that targets Google Chrome users.

Figure 4. Malicious browser extension in Google Chrome

Notice that this extension requires permissions to modify data in all websites, which is highly suspicious:

Figure 5. The malicious browser extension requires permissions such as reading and modifying all data on the visited websites.

We’ve seen this type of malware used in the Brazilian Gizmodo website compromise that spread online banking malware to around 7,000 victims within a two-hour span. Our video (starting at the 10:30 mark) explains how the malware checks the victim’s browser in order to install the malicious add-on.

Based on the Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Network™ feedback in the last 3 months, we found that Brazil is the top country affected by the BROBAN family at 86.95%, and the second affected country is the United States at 2.87%. Additionally, the heat map below shows data on this attack, with the most number of infections centered in São Paulo, Brazil. It’s possible that the large number of infections is because São Paulo is the most populous city in that country.

heat map by BROBAN family

Figure 6. Boleto fraud infections

How was the attack carried out?

With various attack methods, using malicious extensions for this sort of attack opens up some opportunities for cybercriminals.

  • They can change the payment slip the bar code, the related bar code number, or both.
  • They can inject the new numbers acquired from C&C servers or have it hard-coded.

We’ll focus on a particular group that uses a combination of various attack methods.

The file a5f20ef51316ce87f72c1e503ebd01c7 is a malicious Firefox extension, detected as BREX_BROBAN.SMK, which may be spammed or dropped by other malware. The file extension used by Firefox add-on is .xpi, but the file is in fact a .ZIP file. After extraction, the most interesting code is inside the data/content.js file:

Figure 7. Banks prefixes used to match “boletos”

The first variable is a regular expression pattern used to match payment slip numbers so the malicious routines start. The second variable contains 138 Brazilian bank prefixes used by the extension to match a boleto number. When a bar code image is found, the malware downloads a new one from the command-and-control (C&C) server as can be seen in the code below:

Figure 8. Variable containing the C&C address

It also sends the bar code number and the value to the C&C server that responds with a new bar code number matching the same price. By using a C&C server, criminals can also keep control of their business.

Figure 9. Code responsible for C&C communication

As a side note, native speakers will recognize the word “rico”, which is Portuguese for “rich”, used in naming files on the C&C server.

Background operation on C&C servers

We had access to the source code of some files in the C&C servers of this particular malware family. The main file, rico.php has some interesting code:

Figure 10. Source code for C&C operation script rico.php

In the code, $arrX is an array containing the bank account numbers used to generate new bar codes. In fact, these are the bank account numbers where criminals receive the stolen money.

The file rico.php also has payment slip number generation routines stolen from an open source project. Based on bank account numbers, criminals can then generate brand new payment slip numbers with bar codes and return it to the malicious add-on script running on infected users’ machines.

Bar code generation

A custom algorithm is used to generate the bar code using two 10×80 image files, one totally black and another one totally white. The images are hosted on the C&C server, and links to them are returned in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format to the calling script in the malicious browser add-on and injected into the HTML of the payment slip the user has requested to view in his browser.

Figure 11. Algorithm used to generate the bar codes with matching boleto numbers

The image above shows part of the algorithm used by criminals to generate the bar codes with matching boleto numbers. URL links to blank and white bars are replied back to the malicious extension.

Figure 12. Creating a new bard with aligned images

The bar width is controlled by the algorithm. The result is a new bar code made with aligned images, and a new number to be injected into victims’ browsers.

Who’s behind the boleto fraud?

We were able to uncover that the boleto fraud is run by multiple authors, but probably maintained by only a few. We had access to the control panel’s web pages that criminals have developed to keep track of sold kits, specially created for other criminals. These are typically sold in the Brazilian underground for around R$400, or $138 USD.

Considering the techniques used in this attack, we’d say people behind it are not novices as they constantly improve their methods. This malware family has dozens of domains registered and hosted in bullet-proof hosting in Russia, Ukraine and other countries that are used as C&C servers.

Basing on gathered Whois data, the threat actor involved in this not-so-new attack uses the e-mail address mariomotono99[@]outlook.com, which has recently registered the following domains:

  • agoravaicaralho[.]asia
  • bebado[.]asia
  • bebono[.]asia
  • bebulocomemo[.]asia
  • bebum[.]asia
  • controleusuarios[.]asia
  • ficarricomesmo[.]asia
  • mainhaminha[.]asia
  • maninhaminha[.]asia
  • meuamigo[.]ru
  • vamomesmo[.]asia
  • videoslegais[.]asia

Some of them are confirmed to be used by the BROBAN C&C servers, which are used by the JS_BROBAN / BREX_BROBAN malware families. Other domains may be related to different malware campaigns. The following is a list of Google Cloud Storage user names hosting BROBAN:

  • fefwferh45h45hrthrthrthrthrhrthtrh
  • frthrtjhj5j5h5hfdd34343444
  • j8nfnewfnuewfuewbfweewewew
  • jabuinomaiamota
  • m343ff4ufbnmm4uu4nf34m443frr
  • macacaodoidao
  • marujomentemesmomarujomentemesmo
  • mb47747fbjhsdnwnudnfwfewdwedf3
  • mk83nrn32r32nnfbfrbubeunri4i949ht
  • mlki89mmdn8dmfnmfmuurnnfd
  • mmimijfinfi3ij3i3kmnrmmf
  • mnfufefuwnf8nffnfnfn
  • morgadomesmo
  • visualizaoronlines
  • vorugamotulo
  • wfwifjiwjiifiuerfreimmreiferjer

The following Amazon Cloud user names were also used:

  • detranonlinesfevereiro
  • documentoscom
  • marim838nrn8rnnmm

We have already notified Google and Amazon about the malicious accounts.

How Can You Stay Protected Against This Threat?

The FEBRABAN issued a guide on their website for users to determine whether the bar code on their boleto matches the bank prefix or not. The list on the FEBRABAN website has all the bank prefixes in Brazil.

This does not mean that users who aren’t based in Brazil are safe from this threat. Browser-related threats via malicious plugins continue to plague unwitting users, so it is advised to steer clear from unknown browser add-ons. If downloading browser add-ons is absolutely necessary, make sure to check its required permissions, or consider disabling add-ons you don’t recognize.

By keeping their security products and antivirus software up to date, users can stay protected against these threats. Trend Micro Security can detect and block the installation of malicious browser extensions. Trend Micro HouseCall can also remove malicious extensions.

For businesses, the Endpoint Security in Trend Micro Smart Protection Suite protects systems against this type of attack by detecting related files and blocking related URLs and emails through our File Reputation, Web Reputation, and Email Reputation Technologies.

Related hashes:

  • JS_BROBAN.SM
    27cf1e1d8e3ec899e524ac451c233b3150dd8047
    3b429cc2f168898c472c1a65a6ec31f89768e7cd
    778edc94532f84ee9a1b68260023101e80769e18
    917054809ceffa48f90e3ddd5c72d06e5a558cb0
    fb33672a6da83e22acd872379acb2b7dbb977341
    302a9635d92fd8fa7e52076cb35db232f2699c23
    778edc94532f84ee9a1b68260023101e80769e18
    a117746f9cc3aafbd3431f6065308b0bf1e83a93
    f22dbc4d87326fcdcc742a9aeaf32c546c5410d1
    1f3fd0f080bd1fff38437c0604af371f30081966
  • BREX_BROBAN.A
    2cf2ae130c874880da2f96922502209f4d2a6e2b
    be5ec74b3fa2e09c55310819a67c616ac6719bca
  • BREX_BROBAN.B
    5455b6cbd039bc403ed4622bf12ffb5d6538cac9
    0cc0bdc0aebe7958f5ea780e41f5dba36c75ede3
    0c38c6517e9934b7fb77f74ac85dd478c21c2ed6
    0cc0bdc0aebe7958f5ea780e41f5dba36c75ede3
    9287eeec1609b8d710b2c2fa0c959e56a1342f62
    0cc0bdc0aebe7958f5ea780e41f5dba36c75ede3
    f607c025102723cbc45bb9380e609c1817b48e0b
    0cc0bdc0aebe7958f5ea780e41f5dba36c75ede3
    1b31be90bdec114892f255074f8be0ca81d86ce6
    0cc0bdc0aebe7958f5ea780e41f5dba36c75ede3
  • BREX_BROBAN.SMK
    e94ba9922c5f84264f907457c874116821f54c73

Post from: Trendlabs Security Intelligence Blog – by Trend Micro

Multiplatform Boleto Fraud Hits Users in Brazil

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Story added 6. March 2015, content source with full text you can find at link above.