Let’s Encrypt Now Being Abused By Malvertisers

Encrypting all HTTP traffic has long been considered a key security goal, but there have been two key obstacles to this. First, certificates are not free and many owners are unwilling to pay; secondly the certificates themselves are not always something that could be set up by a site owner.

The Let’s Encrypt project was founded with the goal of eliminating these obstacles. The project’s goal is to provide free certificates to all site owners; in addition, software could be set up on a web server to make the process as automated as possible. It is backed by many major Internet companies and non-profit organizations – Akamai, Cisco, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Facebook, and Mozilla to name a few. Let’s Encrypt only issues domain-validated certificates and not extended validation (EV) certificates, which include additional checks regarding the identity of the site owner.

Unfortunately, the potential for Let’s Encrypt being abused has always been present. Because of this, we have kept an eye out for malicious sites that would use a Let’s Encrypt certificate. Starting on December 21, we saw activity going to a malvertising server, with traffic coming from users in Japan. This campaign led to sites hosting the Angler Exploit Kit, which would download a banking Trojan (BKDR_VAWTRAK.AAAFV) onto the affected machine.

Figure 1. Daily hits to malvertising server

We believe that this attack is a continuation of the same malvertising campaign we first identified in September that also targeted Japanese users.

How was this attack carried out? The malvertisers used a technique called “domain shadowing”. Attackers who have gained the ability to create subdomains under a legitimate domain do so, but the created subdomain leads to a server under the control of the attackers. In this particular case, the attackers created ad.{legitimate domain}.com under the legitimate site. Note that we are disguising the name of this site until its webmasters are able to fix this problem appropriately

Traffic to this created subdomain was protected with HTTPS and a Let’s Encrypt certificate, as shown below:

Figure 2. Let’s Encrypt SSL certificate

The domain hosted an ad which appeared to be related to the legitimate domain to disguise its traffic. Parts of its redirection script have also been moved from a JavaScript file into a .GIF file to make identifying the payload more difficult. Anti-AV code similar to what we found in the September attack is still present. In addition, it uses an open DoubleClick redirect – a tactic previously discussed by Kafeine of Malware don’t need Coffee.

Figure 3. Code used by malvertising

Any technology that is meant for good can be abused by cybercriminals, and Let’s Encrypt is no exception. As a certificate authority ourselves we are aware of how the SSL system of trust can be abused. Cases like this one where an attacker is able to create subdomains under a legitimate domain name demonstrate a problem. A certificate authority that automatically issues certificates specific to these subdomains may inadvertently help cybercriminals, all with the domain owner being unaware of the problem and unable to prevent it. These DV certificates can help the hacker gain legitimacy with the public.

Let’s Encrypt only checks domains that it issues against the Google safe browsing API; in addition, they have stated that they do not believe CAs should act as a content filter. Security on the infrastructure is only possible when all critical players – browsers, CAs, and anti-virus companies – play an active role in weeding out bad actors.

CAs should be willing to cancel certificates issued to illicit parties that have been abused by various threat actors. Website owners should ensure that they secure their own website control panels, to ensure that new subdomains beyond their control are not created without their knowledge. Users should also be aware that a “secure” site is not necessarily a safe site, and we also note that the best defense against exploit kits is still keeping software up-to-date to minimize the number of vulnerabilities that may be exploited.

We have notified Let’s Encrypt about this particular certificate being abused.

Indicators of compromise

The payload of the Angler Exploit Kit has the following SHA1 hash:

  • 63c88467a0f67e2f3125fd7d3d15cad0b213a5cb

With additional insights by Kirk Hall and Stephen Hillier

Read more: Let’s Encrypt Now Being Abused By Malvertisers

Story added 6. January 2016, content source with full text you can find at link above.